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GENERAL CORPORATION LAWS: 
HISTORY AND ECONOMICS 
DAVID MCBRIDE* 
“Where there is no bread, there is no Law; where there is no Law, there is no bread.”
 1 
“[T]wo intellectual inventions of the Renaissance, double-entry bookkeeping and the 
corporation, proved vital to the development of European civilization in the New 
World . . . .”
 2 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
The symbiosis of law and business is often noted, less often truly 
appreciated—until either law or economic growth is absent—and much 
debated. The relationship of corporate law to national economics is real, 
appreciated, and being hotly debated on this sixtieth anniversary of the Model 
Business Corporation Act (MBCA). The financial crises, scandals, and 
economic losses of the first decade of the twenty-first century have caused many 
to question the efficacy of state corporate laws—like the MBCA and the 
Delaware General Corporation Law—and advocate fundamental change, 
deemed to be “reform” of those laws.3 
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 1. BENJAMIN M. FRIEDMAN, THE MORAL CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 325 (2006) 
(citing RABBI ELEAZAR BEN AZARIAH, CHAPTERS OF THE FATHERS). 
 2. JOHN STEELE GORDON, AN EMPIRE OF WEALTH: THE EPIC HISTORY OF AMERICAN 
ECONOMIC POWER 9 (2004). 
 3. The recently enacted Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act] contains several provisions that treat 
corporate governance, including most prominently authorization for the SEC to adopt a “proxy access” 
system, Dodd-Frank Act § 971, and “say on pay” and other executive compensation provisions. Dodd-
Frank Act §§ 951–957. For differing views on proxy access, compare Lucian A. Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, 
Private Ordering and the Proxy Access Debate, 65 BUS. LAW. 329 (2010), with Joseph A. Grundfest, 
The SEC’s Proposed Proxy Access Rules: Politics, Economics, and the Law, 65 BUS. LAW. 361 (2010). 
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There are important and legitimate questions being raised about corporate 
law and governance.4 But much of the debate has centered on the appropriate 
level of government to address the subject—whether the law should be the 
domain of the states, the federal government, international bodies, or some 
combination of all of these. This article will leave those arguments aside, for 
they have been better addressed by others.5 Rather, this article will briefly 
address three questions: (1) what are the purposes of the corporate law (or 
other entity law), as reflected by the history of such organizations and how well 
have those laws fulfilled those purposes; (2) what economic phenomena have 
contributed to the success or failure of those laws; and (3) what are the 
implications of these economic observations for corporate and entity law? 
II 
THE HISTORY, PURPOSE, AND SUCCESS OF THE CORPORATE FORM 
Within the past 150 years, non-governmental corporations have become the 
principal social institution by which business and economic activity has been 
conducted—whether for-profit, not-for-profit, or for charitable purposes. It was 
not always so: 
The word [corporation] refers to any association of individuals bound together into a 
corpus, a body sharing a common purpose in a common name. In the past, that 
purpose had usually been communal or religious; boroughs, guilds, monasteries, and 
bishoprics were the earliest European manifestations of the corporate form. They all 
owed their existence, and the privileges stemming from a corporate charter, to an act 
of a sovereign authority. It was assumed, as it is still in nonprofit corporations, that the 
corporate body earned its charter by serving the public good. The same thinking 
applied in the chartering of joint-stock companies in the age of exploration and 
colonization.6 
Before the Civil War in the United States, the corporate charter generally 
was perceived as a privilege granted only by a special act of the legislature for 
 
 4. See generally Brian R. Cheffins, Did Corporate Governance “Fail” During the 2008 Stock 
Market Meltdown? The Case of the S&P 500, 65 BUS. LAW. 1 (2009); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Race 
for the Bottom in Corporate Governance, 95 VA. L. REV. 685 (2009); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, FREEFALL: 
AMERICA, FREE MARKETS, AND THE SINKING OF THE WORLD ECONOMY 151–55 (2010); RICHARD 
A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ’08 AND THE DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION 97–
99 (2009). 
 5. See generally Leo E. Strine, Jr., Breaking the Corporate Governance Logjam in Washington: 
Some Constructive Thoughts on a Responsible Path Forward, 63 BUS. LAW. 1079 (2008); Sean J. 
Griffith & Myron T. Steele, On Corporate Law Federalism: Threatening the Thaumatrope, 61 BUS. 
LAW. 1 (2005); William B. Chandler III & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The New Federalism of the American 
Corporate Governance System: Preliminary Reflections of Two Residents of One Small State, 152 U. PA. 
L. REV. 953 (2003); Renee M. Jones, Rethinking Corporate Federalism in the Era of Corporate Reform, 
29 J. CORP. L. 625 (2004); Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003); David 
A. Skeel, Jr., Icarus and American Corporate Regulation, 61 BUS. LAW. 155 (2005); Lawrence A. 
Hamermesh, The Policy Foundations of Delaware Corporate Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1749 (2006); 
Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of Corporate Law, 58 VAND. L. 
REV. 1573 (2005). 
 6. ALAN TRACHTENBERG, THE INCORPORATION OF AMERICA: CULTURE AND SOCIETY IN THE 
GILDED AGE 5–6 (1982). 
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purposes deemed to be in the public interest.7 Incorporation was not yet 
deemed a right available on application by any private enterprise: “The earliest 
charters were thus bestowed on insurance companies, commercial banks, canal, 
dock, and highway companies . . . .”8 These corporations were not exclusively 
profit-seeking associations, but were quasi-public agencies of the state, 
oftentimes “mixed enterprises” in which public funds were invested with private 
funds for needed internal improvements to transportation facilities, such as 
highways and canals.9 
The situation began to change with the economic growth, both in Europe 
and in the United States, during the nineteenth century, and, in the case of the 
United States, particularly during the period from the Civil War to the First 
World War (1860 through 1914). In the eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries, the American economy was characterized by individually and family-
owned enterprises.10 In the entire colonial period, only seven companies were 
incorporated in the British North American colonies.11 In just the last four years 
of the eighteenth century, however, 335 businesses incorporated in the new 
United States.12 “Organizations with more than a hundred employees were a 
rarity. By the time of the Civil War, however, several railroads were employing 
thousands, and industrial companies were growing as well.”13 In 1811, New York 
became the first state with a general incorporation statute, but it was available 
only to corporations manufacturing textiles, glass, metals, and paint. The 
earliest legislations permitting formation of corporations for any lawful, 
specified purpose were adopted by Connecticut in 1837 and Iowa in 1846.14 
The corporate form had numerous advantages over non-corporate forms. 
The most critical was the doctrine of limited liability. Beginning with the 
railroads in the mid-1800s and accelerating after the Civil War, it became 
necessary to raise large sums of capital for growing enterprises. The pooling of 
small investments by numerous investors became an important means of raising 
those funds, but investors would not be willing to make small investments in 
enterprises they would not control, if doing so exposed them to unlimited 
liability for the debts of the enterprise. The limited liability of stockholders was 
critical, not only to the development of the corporation, but also to the 
economic development of Europe and the United States.15 Other advantages of 
the corporate form included the ability to utilize “modern” management 
techniques, which were being developed during the late nineteenth and early 
 
 7. Id. at 6. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. GORDON, supra note 2, at 228. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 228–29. 
 13. Id. at 228. 
 14. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.01 (2008). 
 15. See GORDON, supra note 2, at 9–11, 228–29. 
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twentieth centuries by professional managers who were not owners of the 
businesses,16 perpetual existence, and the ability to merge.17 The corporate form 
also was utilized as a means to restrain competition and coordinate vertical and 
horizontal integration in many industries.18 
The most significant disadvantage of the corporate form is the well-known 
separation of ownership from operating control of the business.19 This created 
the classic problem of management operating the entity for its personal benefit 
and gave rise to the imposition of fiduciary duties. This problem would pose the 
most significant threat to the efficacy of the corporate form because trust is so 
essential to the maintenance of all forms of cooperative human activity. The 
separation of management from ownership also gave rise to a need for better 
accounting, as stockholders wanted timely information with which to evaluate 
management, and management was tempted to use accounting to make its 
performance appear better.20 Beginning in the 1880s, “[t]he big Wall Street 
banks, which were becoming ever more powerful, and the New York Stock 
Exchange increasingly required companies that . . . wanted to be listed on the 
exchange to conform to what would come to be called ‘generally accepted 
accounting principles’ and to have their books certified by” a newly-created 
profession—the certified public accountant, first legislatively recognized in New 
York in 1896.21 
By the end of the nineteenth century, the laws governing incorporation had 
evolved to respond to the needs of the economy and the objectives of the 
business and financial worlds. No longer a privilege, incorporation became a 
right available to the exuberant businesspersons and financiers of the era. In 
essence, the corporation had evolved from a specialized entity, created for the 
particular ends of the “sovereign,” to an entity created to facilitate new and 
ever evolving forms of organization needed by the economy.22 However, under 
either structure, the corporation was designed for the purpose of facilitating 
common action, not restraining or prohibiting it. Not surprisingly, the laws that 
evolved to facilitate this form increasingly evidenced the characteristic of being 
“empowering” statutes, not regulatory statutes.23 The essential caveats to this 
empowerment were the maintenance of trust, reflected in the fiduciary duties 
 
 16. See TRACHTENBERG, supra note 6, at 83–86. 
 17. GORDON, supra note 2, at 229. 
 18. TRACHTENBERG, supra note 6, at 83–86. 
 19. See GORDON, supra note 2, at 229–30. 
 20. Id. at 230. 
 21. Id. at 231–32. 
 22. By the end of the nineteenth century, the laws treating the corporate form had “converged” in 
providing five basic features that characterized the corporate form: (1) full legal personality, including 
the ability to contract; (2) limited liability for owners and managers; (3) shared ownership by investors 
of capital; (4) delegated management; and (5) transferable shares. Henry Hansmann & Reinier 
Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 439–40 (2001). 
 23. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 3.01 (2008). 
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imposed by the law, and the need for stockholders to be informed about the 
financial affairs of the corporation. 
From this history, it is evident that the legal entity known as the corporation 
had become the favored form of organization for larger businesses, and that 
larger businesses were becoming a greater percentage of the economy.24 This 
phenomenon leads to several conclusions. First, the essential purpose of a 
corporation—or any other form of legal entity—is to facilitate collective action 
by individuals. It allows various persons to make varying contributions to the 
collective effort. Second, the expansion of the corporate form, from 
governmental to quasi-governmental to private enterprise, evidences the 
success of this form of organization and its consequent proliferation. The 
creation of new types of legal entities has continued this proliferation.25 Third, 
while some may question the benefits of growth or the allocation of its benefits 
among groups within society, it would seem no one could reasonably question 
the success of the corporate form in promoting growth and economic 
innovation.26 
III 
FACTORS FOR SUCCESS AND FAILURE 
There are a host of reasons for the economic success of corporations, most 
of which are not directly tied to the law by which corporations are formed, but 
 
 24. By 1904, “about three hundred industrial corporations had won control over more than two 
fifths of all manufacturing in the country, affecting the operations of about four fifths of the nation’s 
industries.” TRACHTENBERG, supra note 6, at 4. 
 25. During the past decade, the limited liability company (LLC) has become the favored form of 
business organization, except with respect to publicly-traded entities, where the corporation remains 
the favored legal entity. See generally Rodney D. Chrisman, LLCs Are the New King of the Hill: An 
Empirical Study of the Number of New LLCs, Corporations, and LPs Formed in the United States 
Between 2004-2007 and How LLCs Were Taxed for Tax Years 2002-2006, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. 
L. 459 (2010). 
 26. See generally GORDON, supra note 2; FRIEDMAN, supra note 1; DANIEL YERGIN & JOSEPH 
STANISLAW, THE COMMANDING HEIGHTS: THE BATTLE FOR THE WORLD ECONOMY (2002). The 
rate at which human economic production has grown has skyrocketed in the past 250 years. According 
to Berkeley economist, J. Bradford Long, per person gross domestic product (GDP) in a hunter-
gatherer society of 15,000 years ago was approximately ninety dollars, increasing to $150 in the 
economy of the ancient Greeks in 1000 B.C. and to $180 in 1750. However, subsequent to 1750, there 
has been a thirty-seven-fold increase in GDP per person to $6,600, with the wealthiest societies 
producing well above that level. It took 99.4% of economic history to reach the wealth levels of hunter-
gatherers, 0.59% of that history to double that level by 1750, and then just 0.01% of that history for 
global wealth levels to reach present levels. Over ninety-seven percent of humanity’s wealth was 
created in just the last 0.1% of our history. ERIC BEINHOCKER, THE ORIGIN OF WEALTH: 
EVOLUTION, COMPLEXITY AND THE RADICAL REMAKING OF ECONOMICS 9–11 (2006). As described 
by economic historian, David Landes, “the Englishman of 1750 was closer in material things to Caeser’s 
legionnaires than to his own great-grand-children.” DAVID S. LANDES, THE UNBOUND PROMETHEUS: 
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN WESTERN EUROPE FROM 1750 TO 
THE PRESENT 5 (1969). This period of incredible growth obviously was driven by the industrial 
revolution and technological advances, but many of those developments were facilitated by and utilized 
by corporations. 
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rather, are a product of the strengths and weaknesses of the individuals who 
participate in or contribute to the enterprise and the social, market, and 
governmental environment in which they operate. But this article will focus 
upon several aspects of economic theory that seem important to the success of 
the corporate form or any form of organization. 
To understand how and why the corporate laws may have contributed to the 
incredible growth of the past 250 years—and to understand how they may 
continue to do so in the future—an understanding of how and why that growth 
occurred is helpful. In The Origin of Wealth: Evolution, Complexity and the 
Radical Remaking of Economics, Eric Beinhocker27 offers a survey and 
synthesis for the layperson of recent developments in economic theory that 
provides some explanation for this economic history.28 He argues that: 
[W]ealth creation is the product of a simple, but profoundly powerful, three-step 
formula—differentiate, select and amplify—the formula of evolution . . . . Evolution is 
an algorithm; it is an all-purpose formula for innovation, a formula that, through its 
special brand of trial and error, creates new designs and solves difficult problems.29 
The biological evolution described by Darwin—which involves 
differentiation by genetic mutation, natural selection, and amplification by 
genetic inheritance—is a type of evolution, but DNA is not the only arena in 
which evolution operates.30 Biological and economic systems are subclasses of a 
more general and universal class of evolutionary systems, and researchers 
 
 27. Eric Beinhocker’s bio reads as follows: 
Eric Beinhocker is a senior fellow at the McKinsey Global Institute (MGI), McKinsey 
& Company’s economics research arm, where he leads research on economic, 
management, and public policy issues. He was previously a partner at McKinsey and a 
leader in its Strategy Practice. His career has bridged both the business and academic 
worlds. He has been a software CEO, a venture capitalist, and an executive director of 
the Corporate Executive Board; at McKinsey he has served clients in a broad range of 
industries, including telecoms, computing, pharmaceuticals, and aerospace. He has 
also held research appointments at the Harvard Business School and the MIT Sloan 
School and has been a visiting scholar at the Santa Fe Institute. He is a graduate of 
Dartmouth College and the MIT Sloan School where he was the Henry Ford II 
Scholar.  
MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST., http://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/perspective/biography/eric.asp (last visited 
Nov. 8, 2010). 
 28. BEINHOCKER, supra note 26. 
 29. Id. at 11–12. Others have argued that “unguided evolutionary process may, or may not, lead to 
economic efficiency. Unfortunately, natural selection does not necessarily choose the firms (or 
institutions) that are the best for the long run. One of the main criticisms of financial markets is that 
they have become increasingly shortsighted.” STIGLITZ, supra note 4, at 273. Beinhocker, however, 
does not advocate for an unguided evolutionary process. As noted below, Beinhocker believes that the 
government may play an important role in establishing the environment in which evolutionary 
processes operate—either by setting goals or by setting constraints. 
 30. See BEINHOCKER, supra note 26, at 192. Beinhocker describes an algorithm as “a recipe that 
takes some set of inputs (for example, flour, eggs, sugar, butter), mechanically works them through 
some process (for example, stir together well, bake at 350°F or 175°C for fifteen minutes), and, if the 
instructions are followed, reliably produces some set of outputs (for example, cookies).” Beinhocker 
defines substrates as “the material or information on which the algorithm acts,” and argues that 
“evolution is an algorithm that is substrate neutral. It takes information about the designs of things and 
mindlessly grinds that information through a process.” Id. 
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believe that there are general laws of evolutionary systems.31 Beinhocker notes 
Daniel Dennett’s assertion that “evolution [is] a general-purpose algorithm for 
creating ‘design without a designer.’”32 
Evolution creates or discovers designs through a process of trial and error—
a variety of candidate designs are created and tried out in the environment; the 
successful designs are retained and replicated.33 An evolutionary process results 
in the emergence of greater structure and complexity over time, as evolution 
builds on the successes of the past to create novel designs for the future.34 As the 
world changes, so too do the designs change and adapt.35 
As Beinhocker explains, “[t]he notion that the economy is an evolutionary 
system is a radical idea, especially because it directly contradicts much of the 
standard theory in economics developed over the past one hundred years.”36 
Since the late nineteenth century, the organizing paradigm of economics has 
been that the economy is an equilibrium system, essentially a system at rest.37 
That economic paradigm was borrowed from another field of science: 
Newtonian physics.38 But while physics has moved far beyond the Newtonian 
universe, economics has not.39 The new paradigm in physics—as well as other 
areas of science—is complex systems.40 Those are systems of many dynamically 
interacting parts, in which the micro-level interactions of the parts or particles 
lead to the emergence of macro-level patterns of behavior or emergent 
characteristics not observed at the micro level.41 When the parts or particles of 
the system have the ability to process information and adapt to their 
environment—Beinhocker refers to such parts or particles as agents—the 
resulting system is known as a “complex adaptive system.”42 Evolutionary 
 
 31. Id. at 12 (citing JOHN H. HOLLAND, ADAPTION IN NATURAL AND ARTIFICIAL SYSTEMS 
(1992); L.D. WHITLEY, FOUNDATIONS OF GENETIC ALGORITHMS (1993); MELANIE MITCHELL, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO GENETIC ALGORITHMS (1996); L.F. LANDWEBER & E. WINFREE, EVOLUTION AS 
COMPUTATION (2002); J.P. CRUTCHFIELD & P. SCHUSTER, EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS: EXPLORING 
THE INTERPLAY OF SELECTION, ACCIDENT, NEUTRALITY, AND FUNCTION (2003)). 
 32. Id. at 13 (citing DANIEL C. DENNETT, DARWIN’S DANGEROUS IDEA 28–34, 48–60 (1995); 
RICHARD DAWKINS, THE BLIND WATCHMAKER (1986)). Beinhocker’s description of evolution 
borrows heavily from the work of Daniel Dennett, an evolutionary theorist and director of the Center 
for Cognitive Studies at Tufts University, and from Richard Dawkins, the Oxford evolutionary theorist. 
 33. Id. at 14. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 16. Beinhocker notes that viewing the economy as an evolutionary system is “radical” 
when compared to traditional economic theory, but it is not new. In fact, Darwin’s concept of evolution 
was sparked by Robert Malthus’s economic writings, and, during the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, economists Thorstein Veblen, Alfred Marshall, Joseph Schumpter, and Friedrich 
Hayek examined the relationship between economics and evolutionary theory. Id. at 16–17. 
 37. Id. at 17. 
 38. See id. 
 39. See id. at 18. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
MCBRIDE 12/31/2010  
8 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 74:1 
systems are merely one type of complex adaptive system, and some social 
scientists have wondered whether economies might be another such system.43 
The study of economic systems as complex adaptive systems or evolutionary 
systems has created new schools of economic thought, known as “complexity 
economics” or “evolutionary economics.”44 
The economic evolution described by Beinhocker “is not a single process, 
but rather the result of three interlinked processes.”45 The first of these linked 
processes is the evolution of physical technology, such as bronze-making 
techniques, steam engines, and microchips.46 The second process is the evolution 
of social technologies, or “ways of organizing people to do things,” such as the 
rule of law, money, joint-stock companies, and venture capital.47 The two are 
equally important, and “coevolve with each other.”48 An example is that the 
invention of the spinning frame (physical) made it economical to organize cloth-
making in large factories (social), which, in turn, promoted development of 
water power, steam, and electricity (physical).49 Finally, before the innovations 
of physical technologies and social technologies have an impact on the world, 
businesses must be formed to provide the goods and services created by these 
technologies to a marketplace. “Businesses are themselves a form of design,” 
integrating “strategy, organizational structure, management processes, culture, 
and a host of other factors.”50 
These three evolutionary processes: physical technology, social technology, 
and business organization interact and coevolve. What emerges is a complex 
adaptive system that has three key characteristics: (1) many dynamically 
interacting parts, (2) the parts have the ability to adapt to changes around them, 
and (3) micro-level interactions of parts or particles lead to the emergence of 
macro-level patterns of behavior different from the micro patterns that underlie 
the system.51 Perhaps most significantly, this complex adaptive system is not a 
system designed from the “top-down,” but rather emerges from the “bottom-
up.”52 The existing global economy is just such a complex adaptive system, 
“orders of magnitude more complex than any other physical or social structure 
ever built by humankind.”53 
 
 43. Id. at 18–19. 
 44. Id. at 19. See also Ulrich Witt, Evolutionary Economics, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY 
OF ECONOMICS (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2008). 
 45. BEINHOCKER, supra note 26, at 15. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 15–16. Beinhocker borrows these concepts from the evolutionary economist Richard 
Nelson of Columbia University. See RICHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY 
THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE (1982); RICHARD R. NELSON, THE SOURCES OF ECONOMIC 
GROWTH (1996).  
 49. BEINHOCKER, supra note 26, at 16. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 18. 
 52. Id. at 18–19. 
 53. Id. at 6. 
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But lest this all sound entirely too mechanistic, there is another aspect of the 
process, and it involves that greatest of mysteries—human nature. Human 
nature is an inevitable ingredient in the evolution of these designs; it is a critical 
factor in their success or failure.54 These evolutionary processes are all driven—
at least in part—by human efforts to seek new and better ways of meeting our 
needs or desires. Beinhocker asks what spurs these efforts, and here is his 
answer: 
The answer lies in the magic of non-zero-sum games . . . . [In] zero-sum games . . . one 
person’s gain is another person’s loss . . . . [In] non-zero-sum games . . . both people 
can be made better off by cooperating. Cooperation in non-zero-sum games has a 
1+1=3 logic, whereby if you scratch my back, I’ll scratch yours, and together we can do 
something neither can do as well on our own and we both benefit. Non-zero-sum 
cooperation is one of those Good Tricks of survival that has been widely employed by 
biological evolution. Dogs hunt in packs, termites collectively build mounds, fish swim 
in schools, and, like most primates, members of Homo sapiens live in groups.55 
The search for better ways of organizing ourselves—better social 
technologies—is the search for forms of organization “that enable people to 
play and capture the benefits of non-zero-sum games.”56 The success of social 
organizations in accomplishing this result turns on three critical factors. First, 
the organization must provide the potential for non-zero-sum payoffs or gains.57 
These gains can be produced by a plethora of means including technological 
improvements, division of labor, exchanging different contributions (labor from 
some, capital from others), increasing returns to scale, and risk-sharing.58 
Second, people must share the benefits to be gained from the organization.59 
For people to have an incentive to cooperate, they must receive some share of 
the spoils, otherwise, cooperation collapses and the non-zero-sum gains 
evaporate.60 It is here that the tension between selfish interest and collective 
interest is most intense, and this is the sphere in which gains that physical 
 
 54. Subsequent to the financial crisis that began in 2007, classical economic theory and “free-
market” theories have come under substantial attack. One of the criticisms is that classical economic 
theory is based upon unrealistic assumptions about human behavior. In particular, classical economics 
assumes human agents that use complex deductive calculations to assess self-interest, make no 
cognitive errors and have no cognitive bias, have complete information, and have no need to learn or 
adapt. See generally id. at 115–19. See also STIGLITZ, supra note 4, at 249–53; POSNER, supra note 4, at 
79–116. 
 55. BEINHOCKER, supra note 26, at 265–66. (citing SAMUEL BOWLES, MICROECONOMICS: 
BEHAVIOR, INSTITUTIONS AND EVOLUTION (2004); HERBERT GINTIS, GAME THEORY EVOLVING: A 
PROBLEM-CENTERED INTRODUCTION TO MODELING STRATEGIC INTERACTION (2000); H. PEYTON 
YOUNG, INDIVIDUAL STRATEGY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE: THE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF 
INSTITUTIONS (1998); ROBERT ALEXROD, THE COMPLEXITY OF COOPERATION (1997); BRIAN 
SKYRMS, EVOLUTION OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (1996); ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF 
COOPERATION (1984) for the centrality of “game theory” to an understanding of the evolution of 
social norms and institutions). See also R. WRIGHT, NON-ZERO: THE LOGIC OF HUMAN DESTINY 
(2000). 
 56. BEINHOCKER, supra note 26, at 266. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 266–67. 
 59. Id. at 267. 
 60. Id. 
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technologies make possible might be lost. There are two characteristics that 
promote a sharing of gains in a manner that promotes continuing cooperation: 
trust and communication.61 Both are critical because the sharing of gains 
requires trust in the reciprocal nature of the cooperation and communication 
about how the gains can be maximized and shared.62 Trust, especially among 
strangers, is facilitated by the rule of law. But law cannot replace a lack of 
trust.63 
Third, the social organization must have a means of dealing with those who 
“cheat” by seeking to capture the benefits of cooperation without contributing 
themselves (the “free rider”) or by seeking to capture the benefits without 
sharing those benefits with others who have contributed.64 Beinhocker notes 
that “[t]he incentive to cheat means that cooperation is inherently difficult to 
achieve and potentially unstable even once attained.”65 Psychological research 
demonstrates that 
the consistent and deep-rooted nature of human cooperative-reciprocity behavior. 
Evolution has steered us in a direction whereby we are naturally inclined to be 
cooperative to capture the riches of non-zero-sum games. Nevertheless, it has also 
equipped us with a sensitivity to cheating, expectations of fairness, and a willingness to 
mete out punishment to those we believe have crossed the line.66 
Human history has evidenced the evolution of increasingly complex and 
sophisticated social structures for addressing these three prerequisites of non-
zero-sum interaction.67 From the family, to tribes, to agricultural settlements, 
and to nation-states and modern corporations, the trend has been to ever-larger 
organizations for cooperative activity encompassing greater numbers and wider 
geography.68 Prevailing social technology can be decisive of whether a social 
organization can realize and perpetuate non-zero-sum gains.69 One study has 
demonstrated that the most significant factors in the creation of wealth are not 
natural resources, sophisticated physical technology, or competent 
government.70 The most important factors are the rule of law, the existence of 
property rights, a well-organized banking system, economic transparency, a lack 
of corruption, and other social factors that promote non-zero-sum gains.71 
The modern corporation is the largest and most complex non-state 
institution in the world. It was made possible by technologies that allow for 
communication across vast space and the ability to process substantial amounts 
 
 61. Id. at 274. 
 62. See id. at 267–68. 
 63. Id. at 274. 
 64. Id. at 268–70. 
 65. Id. at 268. 
 66. Id. at 269. 
 67. See id. at 270–75. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 261. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
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of information. It integrates a host of social technologies including money, 
accounting, and limited liability. Some cognitive scientists even believe that 
such organizations are capable of having emergent, cognitive capabilities that 
no individual in the organization has and that are greater than the sum of all the 
people within the organization.72 Ironically, Beinhocker states that 
[British Petroleum (BP)], with its 103,000 employees in over a hundred countries 
around the world, is a marvel of human cooperation. The vast majority of its people 
have never met and never will meet, but are bound together in a web of social 
structures, norms, protocols, legal structures, and incentives that enable them to work 
together for a common purpose. If one extends that web of cooperation beyond BP’s 
immediate employees to include its 1.3 million shareholders and thousands of supplier 
and other partner companies, then the scale of a social structure such as BP becomes 
even more remarkable.73 
Yet, BP’s oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico during the Spring and Summer of 
2010 evidences the ability of such organizations to create massive harm as well 
as good. 
The foregoing analysis is, of necessity, very generalized and surveys 
developing areas of study and analysis. Nonetheless, this focus upon 
evolutionary or complexity economic analysis and upon game theory may 
contribute to a better understanding of the attributes of corporate and entity 
law that will facilitate reaching societal or collective goals. 
IV 
THE IMPLICATIONS FOR CORPORATE LAW 
There are three main conclusions from Beinhocker’s survey that may have 
potential implications for corporate and entity law: 
1. The creation of wealth—and the accomplishment of any human 
goals—are a function of evolutionary processes that create differing 
designs or structures, select for the design that is most fit for the 
environment in which it operates, and allow for the amplification or 
replication of that design. Organizational structures are one such 
design. 
2.  Economic systems are complex adaptive systems that were not and 
cannot be created from the top-down, but evolved from the bottom-
up. The systems are far too complex to be managed by any singular 
source or authority because no one can know how all the parts work 
together. The parts of the system also are capable of evolving and 
adapting to meet its defined goals or humans needs. 
3. Social organizations that evolve successfully will be those that 
promote the realization of non-zero-sum gains. This requires the 
 
 72. Id. at 275–76. (citing JOHN MICKLETHWAIT & ADRIAN WOOLDRIDGE, THE COMPANY: A 
SHORT HISTORY OF A REVOLUTIONARY IDEA (2003)). 
 73. BEINHOCKER, supra note 26, at 276. 
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intelligence and ingenuity to develop technologies and organizations 
that create such gains, it requires an allocation of gains in a manner 
satisfactory to promoting and preserving the cooperation of those 
needed to realize the gains, and it requires a system to reliably punish 
those who cheat. 
Each of these observations has some significant, if not surprising, 
implications for the corporate law. 
A.  Allowing for Evolution 
Legal structures that allow for evolutionary processes are important to the 
success and survival of any social structure. Freedom to experiment is important 
to fostering this process. The corporate law should allow the flexibility to 
develop new social technologies and adapt to change, so long as that flexibility 
does not sacrifice some equally important value. This characteristic has been 
part of the empowering philosophy of both the MBCA and the Delaware 
General Corporation Law.74 With respect to many of the ongoing debates about 
what form of corporate governance is most advantageous, evolutionary theory 
suggests that the participants in corporate organizations ought to have the 
flexibility to experiment with different structures and resolve those issues for 
themselves. While the general corporation law contains default structures that 
operate in the absence of a conscious decision to vary them, the ability to vary 
those provisions is valuable.75 
For example, stockholders ought to have the ability to experiment with 
structures that enhance their ability to exercise some control over the 
organization. The board-centered structure that is part of both the MBCA and 
the Delaware General Corporate Law ought to be subject to change and 
experimentation.76 The empowering philosophy of these statutes ought to not be 
 
 74. Various theorists have argued that free contracting in a competitive system will promote the 
general welfare. See generally FRANK EASTERBROOK & DANIEL FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991). This proposition has been applied to competition among 
states for incorporations. See generally ROBERT ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE 
LAW (1993). But see Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, Does the Evidence Favor State 
Competition in Corporate Law?, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1775, 1778–81 (2002). The financial crisis of the past 
three years has generated substantial criticism of “efficient market” theory as the method for achieving 
or measuring the common good. Evolutionary or complexity economics may lead to certain conclusions 
also supported by efficient market theory, but based upon a different economic analysis. Beinhocker 
questions efficient market theories based upon traditional economic analysis. BEINHOCKER, supra note 
26, at 21–75. See also STIGLITZ, supra note 4, at 239–48, 265–71. 
 75. For example, there are different models for the structure of corporate boards. The same model 
may not be the best model at all times for all corporations. Easterbrook, supra note 4, at 694–95. The 
point of evolutionary theory is that no one can determine a priori what is the best model, even for most 
firms, most of the time. Rather, boards operate as part of a complex adaptive system in which the 
fitness of the model will be determined by an evolutionary process operating from the ground up. 
 76. There is a considerable debate over the roles of stockholders and directors. For example, there 
is a plethora of criticism of stockholder activism, contending that stockholders are conflicted in their 
goals, short-term oriented, and uninformed. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited 
Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 601 (2006); Lynn A. Stout, The Mythical Benefits of 
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limited to empowering boards of directors. It also ought to extend to 
empowering stockholders, so long as other important values are not sacrificed. 
Similarly, in the longstanding debate between stockholder interest and 
stakeholder interest, the corporate law should be flexible enough to allow for 
experimentation, allowing other interests to be considered, if desired by the 
participants. In addition, the law ought to allow flexibility when selecting the 
purposes for which the corporation is created, recognizing that for-profit 
activities are not the only ends to be served by the corporate form of 
organization.77 In essence, evolution will test the fitness of the various and 
competing theories advanced with respect to corporate governance. 
There are limitations on the principle of flexibility and two are worth noting 
here. As explained below, the fiduciary duty of loyalty applicable to those who 
manage the assets and property of others is important to maintaining the type 
of organization that can create non-zero-sum gains. Experimentation that would 
jeopardize the existence and enforcement of those duties should be carefully 
examined. If game theory is correct, forms of social organizations that 
undermine trust are inherently dysfunctional in the long run. In addition, forms 
of organization that limit communication between corporate constituencies—
especially between stockholders, managers, and directors—operate to hinder 
the realization of non-zero-sum gains. Experimentation that would jeopardize 
the ability of stockholders and directors to obtain information about the 
 
Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L. REV. 789 (2007); Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing 
Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. REV. 561 (2006); Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: 
The Role of Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637 (2006). Others argue that stockholder activism is 
associated with better long-term performance of the corporation. See, e.g., George W. Dent, Jr., The 
Essential Unity of Shareholders and the Myth of Investor Short-Termism, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 97 (2010) 
(exhaustively reviewing the literature critical of stockholder activism and the literature demonstrating 
the benefits of stockholder activism); Easterbrook, supra note 4, at 695 (citing Harold Demsetz & 
Kenneth Lehm, The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences, 93 J. POL. ECON. 
1155, 1161 (1985) (arguing that corporations in which individual investors or small groups of investors 
own large blocks of stock perform better because the owners are good monitors)). 
 77. The financial crisis of the past three years—and especially the government assistance provided 
to publicly-held corporations—has posed a fundamental challenge to the prevailing theories of 
corporate structure and purpose. Those events have challenged the assumption that the costs of the 
failure of corporate governance are only borne by the participants in creating, managing, and owning 
those entities. If corporate governance was a causative factor in the financial crisis—a point that is hotly 
debated—then that failure imposed tremendous “external costs” on persons other than directors, 
managers, and stockholders. STIGLITZ, supra note 4, at 15–19; POSNER, supra note 4, at 106–08, 114–15. 
In light of those costs and the resulting rescue efforts, it is not surprising that profound questions are 
being raised about the ultimate purposes to be served by the creation and operation of business entities. 
Of the six dominant theories of corporate governance, four are premised on long-term profit 
maximization for stockholders as the primary, if not exclusive, objective of the corporate enterprise, 
while two of the theories allow for the consideration of the interest of other constituencies or broader 
societal interests. J.W. Verret, Treasury Inc.: How the Bailout Reshapes Corporate Theory and Practice, 
27 YALE J. ON REG. 283, 315–26 (2010). One commentator has proposed that “shareholder primacy”—
profit maximization for the enterprise and stockholders—be a default setting that would give way in the 
case of an emergency, such as the financial crisis of 2008. See generally Robert J. Rhee, Fiduciary 
Exemption for Public Necessity: Shareholder Profit, Public Good, and the Hobson’s Choice During a 
National Crisis, 17 GEO. MASON L. REV. 661 (2010). 
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corporation—subject to important confidentiality and trade-secret concerns—
should be carefully examined. 
Another important caveat about flexibility relates to the phenomenon of 
“too big to fail.” Evolutionary processes necessarily involve change that is 
adaptive and change that is dysfunctional. The theory is that the process will 
“select” the successes from the failures. But what if the universe of 
organizations is so limited that the failure of one organization will result in the 
failure of that entire segment of the economy—or even of the entire economy? 
Biological evolution produces species that become extinct as well as those that 
proliferate. The answer to this paradox is not simple, and this issue poses a 
significant challenge to the utility of evolutionary economics, which 
presupposes a diversity of business forms on which selection for fitness 
operates. Nonetheless, freezing innovation and change by selecting a single 
form of organization deemed to be the “best” seems both hopeless and ill-
advised. Changes in the environment in which corporations operate, including 
the demands and needs they are attempting to meet to be successful, will never 
end. Corporations must be able to adapt to those changes, and that adaption 
will involve experimentation. Nonetheless, experimentation that would produce 
catastrophic failure is not a prescription for accomplishing any societal goals. 
The options would seem to be limited to: (1) minimize the size of the 
institutions so that failure would not be systemic, (2) manage the failure so that 
the resources of the corporation are re-deployed in new organizations without 
too great a systemic cost to the economy and without engendering “moral 
hazard,” or (3) allow failure with whatever consequences result. As of yet, it 
does not appear any satisfactory solution has been found.78 But a respect for 
innovation and experimentation cannot ignore the size and concentration of 
economic—as well as governmental—power and resources. That very 
concentration may stifle the evolutionary process. 
B.  The Illusion of Managing a Complex Adaptive System 
The global economy undoubtedly is a complex adaptive system. The ability 
of any lawmakers to control or manage that system is not simply limited by the 
confines of territorial jurisdiction; it also is limited by the ability to understand 
the interactions of the multitude of factors affecting its operation. Nonetheless, 
this conclusion does not mean the system ought to be left to operate in 
whatever fashion it does. Beinhocker suggests a distinction that may be helpful 
in this regard: 
Policies that get the government involved in differentiating, selecting, and amplifying 
[physical or social technologies and business organizations] would be seen as 
 
 78. Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act creates a new insolvency process for large, interconnected 
companies whose failure creates a significant risk to the financial stability of the United States. 
However, there is serious question whether the process created by Title II is sufficient to avoid the 
adverse and systemic damage that supposedly was prevented by the Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(TARP). 
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interfering in economic evolution and have all the problems discussed in the critique 
of socialist economies . . . . In contrast, policies that shape the fitness environment, 
while leaving . . . selection and amplification [of technologies and business 
organizations] to market mechanisms, are a different matter.79 
This prescription would leave the structure and form of business 
organizations to the evolutionary processes allowed by flexible business 
organization laws, while allowing government regulation to set the parameters 
within which such evolutionary and market processes would operate. Any 
evolutionary process operates within an environment that sets the parameters 
by which fitness is tested. Cold environments produce certain physical traits 
that promote survival, and hot environments produce other physical traits that 
will promote survival. What will succeed depends upon the external 
environment in which the evolutionary process operates and to which that 
process must adapt. The law may establish the “environment” in which social 
organizations, including corporations, operate by defining the outcomes being 
sought and the constraints in which the evolutionary process will operate. 
Setting such parameters does not necessarily result in losing the benefits of an 
evolutionary process. The law may define some of the ends, and the means to 
reach those ends will be created by an evolutionary process. This paradigm also 
may reconcile the competing, and sometimes conflicting, roles of federal law (or 
multinational law) and state entity law. The state law allows for the 
evolutionary process of design creation and selection; federal or multinational 
law sets the environment in which that process operates, thereby setting the 
parameters by which “fitness” will be measured. 
C. Non-zero-sum Games and Fiduciary Duties 
Game theory postulates that social organizations that promote trust and 
communication between cooperating individuals will better realize the gains 
possible from non-zero-sum interactions and better sustain such interactions. 
There are a number of differing groups that must cooperate to produce an 
effective corporation, but the relationships of most concern to the corporate law 
are those between (1) officers and directors, (2) stockholders and officers and 
directors, and (3) among stockholders. A lack of trust and communication 
between these groups will presumably undermine the ability of the corporation 
to produce gain. 
Game theory also postulates that social organizations must have the ability 
to identify and discipline cheaters—those who do not reciprocate in sharing 
benefits or those who “free ride” on the work of others. The precise “bargain” 
that cooperating parties may strike—and consequently the definition of 
cheating—may vary from organization to organization. According to John Nash 
(profiled in the popular book and movie, A Beautiful Mind), the bargain struck 
for dividing the gains from non-zero-sum interactions depends upon how much 
each of the parties values the benefits of the deal, and what alternatives are 
 
 79. BEINHOCKER, supra note 26, at 426 (emphasis in original). 
MCBRIDE 12/31/2010  
16 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 74:1 
available to each of the parties.80 The trade is made “at the point at which no 
one has any incentive to change position, given the actions of the other. This 
point became known as the Nash equilibrium.”81 
The most critical component of the corporate law for establishing and 
enforcing trust between directors and officers, on the one hand, and 
stockholders, on the other, is the fiduciary duty of loyalty. The MBCA codifies 
that duty in sections 8.31 and 8.42—which obligate directors and officers, 
respectively, to act “in the manner the director reasonably believes to be in the 
best interests of the corporation”82—and in subchapter F, which deals with 
directors’ conflict-of-interest transactions. The Delaware law imposes similar 
fiduciary duties on directors and officers, although those duties are developed 
in the case law and not by statutory codification. In both cases, the corporate 
law does not allow those fiduciary duties to be modified or eliminated, and in 
the case of the Delaware General Corporation Law, a director’s liability for 
money damages for breaches of such a duty may not be eliminated.83 The 
MBCA is somewhat more permissive in allowing directors to be exculpated 
from monetary liability for breaches of the duty of loyalty.84 
Game theory suggests that laws that undermine the obligations of the duty 
of loyalty could undermine trust and, ultimately, the cooperation necessary to 
any successful social organization. To a certain extent, the parties may be able 
to contract as to their expectations of each other, thereby establishing trust 
through the mechanism of compliance with contractual undertakings.85 
However, such contractual arrangements are more effective if they are the 
result of real bargaining and are truly reciprocal. Contracts of adhesion that are 
so one-sided as to destroy any sense of reciprocity are more likely to undermine 
trust rather than promote it.86 
 
 80. Id. at 267. 
 81. Id. at 267–68 (emphases omitted). 
 82. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 8.31, 8.42 (2008). 
 83. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001). 
 84. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 2.02(b)(4) (2008). 
 85. See generally Myron T. Steele, Freedom of Contract and Default Contractual Duties in 
Delaware Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, 46 AM. BUS. L.J. 221 (2009). 
 86. The proposition that contractual agreements—either real or hypothetical—may be either the 
best utilitarian outcome or the fairest outcome is hotly debated. See, e.g., J. William Callison & Allan 
W. Vestal, Contractarianism and Its Discontents: Reflections on Unincorporated Business Organization 
Law Reform, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 493 (2009). In order to preserve the long-term cooperation 
essential to creating non-zero-sum gains, the contract should produce a division of gains deemed by the 
participants in the exchange as minimally fair. As one commentator has noted, “actual contracts carry 
moral weight insofar as they realize two ideals—autonomy and reciprocity.” MICHAEL J. SANDEL, 
JUSTICE: WHAT’S THE RIGHT THING TO DO? 144 (2009). The autonomy of the contracting parties may 
be undermined by their unequal bargaining positions, and the reciprocity of the contract may be 
undermined by a host of factors including the relative knowledge and judgment of the parties. See id. at 
144–51. The long-term “fitness” of a purely contractual model for legal entities may depend upon how 
close or far the contract is from the ideals of autonomy and reciprocity. Two factors in evaluating such 
matters are the size of the enterprise and the role of the parties in setting the terms of the contract. 
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The need for trust also is critical in the relationship between officers and 
directors. Directors are largely dependent upon officers to provide the 
information necessary for decisions, to present the risks and benefits of various 
options in an even-handed and candid manner, and to alert the directors as to 
issues that need to be addressed. Officers determined to control the decisions 
made by the board can attempt to do so by limiting information, biasing the 
analysis of options, or failing to alert the board to relevant issues. In such an 
environment, it is difficult for the board process to be meaningful, and, if the 
board perceives it is operating in such an environment, the board’s relationship 
either with the officers or the stockholders will be undermined. The relationship 
with officers will be undermined because the board will no longer trust the 
information or analysis being provided. The relationship with the stockholders 
will be undermined because the stockholders may perceive the board as not 
protecting their interest, but merely “rubber-stamping” the proposals made by 
management. 
Finally, the need for trust among stockholders is an increasing issue. The 
default—and largely mandated—structure of the corporation is built upon the 
model of stockholder democracy. Each stockholder largely is dependent upon 
the judgment of a majority of stockholders as to who should be the directors of 
the corporation, what fundamental transactions (such as a merger) should be 
undertaken, and what contractual terms should be specified among interested 
parties with respect to the corporate arrangement (such as what provisions 
should be in the certificate of incorporation or the bylaws). This model is 
premised on the idea that all stockholders—either in the long or short run—
seek to maximize the value of the corporation. The use of classes of stock with 
differing terms and powers can create conflicts among stockholders and render 
stockholders distrustful of each other and corporate governance. Institutional 
stockholders may have financial interests that may conflict with the interest of 
others in maximizing the value of the corporation (such as relationships with 
the corporation in addition to being a mere stockholder, or competing 
investments). Finally, new derivative instruments may provide opportunities for 
stockholders to benefit from the failure or lack of success of the corporation, 
and those interests may be larger and more significant than the stockholders’ 
interest in the stock. 
Game theory also postulates that communication is critical to the ability of a 
social organization to realize the gains of non-zero-sum interactions. The 
corporate laws and the federal securities law operate to promote 
communications in certain respects. The corporate law allows stockholders to 
obtain corporate books and records for certain purposes relevant to their 
investment, and the securities laws mandate certain disclosures. Laws that 
restrict a stockholders’ ability to obtain information may undermine 
communication and, in turn, undermine the effectiveness of corporations. On 
the other hand, more information is not necessarily better information. The 
volume of information may be so burdensome that it becomes useless. In the 
final analysis, the information that officers provide to boards and that boards 
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provide to stockholders may be more effective by focusing boards and 
stockholders, respectively, on the important issues and decisions, the salient 
pros and cons, and the value judgments made in collecting and presenting the 
information. In addition, volumes of information may render the situation more 
opaque, not more transparent. Once the information is not trusted, the 
relationship between the parties may become dysfunctional. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
The corporate form was created and succeeded in a much simpler world 
than the world of today. The increasing size and complexity of corporations and 
the financial markets has created an increasing number of problems with 
respect to the most efficient and fair form of organization, maintaining the trust 
necessary for successfully functioning social organizations and markets, and 
facilitating the flow of information and communication between interested 
parties. These challenges may require experimentation with new forms of 
organization to ascertain by trial and error what forms may best address these 
issues. If evolutionary economics and game theory are correct, those new forms 
that best address these issues ought to succeed in the long run. In addition, if 
evolutionary economics is correct, the law would operate best by allowing 
experimentation with respect to means, even if the law sets the ends desired and 
imposes certain constraints. But the law also requires a modesty to 
acknowledge its own limitations and a realization that the law is an imperfect 
expression that requires careful and constant reconsideration. The sixtieth 
anniversary of the MBCA is a perfect occasion for such reconsideration. 
 
